Public Concern at Work - Getting the Balance Right

Getting the Balance Right

Below is our submisison to the Committee’s inquiry into how whistleblowing is working. In January 2005, the Committee on Standards in Public Life published the report of this inquiry and its recommendations on whistleblowing can be viewed here.

In March 2005, the House of Commons debated whistleblowing in public life and these recommendations from the Committee. This debate can be viewed here. In December 2005, the Government responded to the Committee’s recommendations and this response can be read here.

Committee on Standards in Public Life

“Getting the Balance Right”

Submission from Public Concern at Work addressing the
Questions about whistleblowing

Q. 17 What are the key elements of good practice likely to deliver effective whistleblowing policy and practice in public bodies?
The Committee’s recommendations on whistleblowing have focussed on providing assurances that staff can raise concerns of malpractice safely. Taking the first three reports together 1, the Committee recommended that whistleblowing arrangements should:

state clearly that malpractice is taken seriously in the organisation;
indicate the sorts of matters regarded as malpractice;
respect the confidentiality of staff raising concerns if requested;
provide the means to raise concerns outside of line management;
indicate how concerns may be raised with a supervisory body;
provide penalties for maliciously making false allegations;
allow access to an external body, such as an independent charity;
give staff of contractors access to the same policy; and
ensure staff are left in no doubt about the avenues open to them.

In our experience, these remain the key elements in encouraging and enabling staff to raise concerns. For the following reasons, the most important of these is ensuring staff are aware of the whistleblowing avenues.

First, an effective whistleblowing policy should - as the Committee restates in this Issues Paper - be both simple and practical:

“The essence of a whistleblowing system is that staff should be able to by-pass the direct management line, because that may well be the area about which their concerns arise, and that they should be able to go outside the organisation if they feel the overall management is engaged in an improper course.”

Ensuring that staff are left in no doubt about the senior internal and external whistleblowing options open is the most effective way of preserving and asserting the simplicity and practicality of the arrangements. It reduces the need for staff to hunt down the detailed policy and asserting such a clear message means that a public body can benefit from whistleblowing, even where its particular policy is overly legalistic, bureaucratic or defensive in tone.

Secondly, even an excellent policy is of little or no practical use if staff are unaware of it or do not readily know what to do if they feel unable to raise a concern with line management or if it has not been properly addressed. Linked to this, low levels of awareness mean whistleblowing can have no deterrent effect on a public official who sees an opportunity to evade controls and break the rules, whether or not to his or her personal advantage.

Thirdly, as to organisational culture, ensuring staff know of both a senior officer and an external body for whistleblowing concerns shows them that accountability is a practical reality and relevant, rather than some vague notion, tick-box exercise or the means to allocate blame after the event. In our view, such a simple step will also help embed a culture of sound internal systems, backed by effective independent oversight.

Fourthly, if staff are regularly reminded of the whistleblowing avenues open to them, genuine concerns will more likely be raised when they first arise and before serious damage is done and so the public interest is furthered. This will also reduce the risk of abuse where an official is aware of some misconduct but decides to keep it in his back pocket to use at a time of his choosing and convenience as (a) others will more likely have raised the concern earlier and (b) the reasons for the delay are open to question.

Fifthly, survey evidence suggests that awareness of whistleblowing is not high among staff in public bodies. In its evidence to this Inquiry, the Audit Commission says its surveys on fraud and corruption controls show that one-half of staff in the NHS and local government are not aware of whistleblowing policy or protection. A survey 2 we jointly conducted with UNISON of its representatives and members in the NHS showed that 48% were not aware their Trust had a whistleblowing policy. The Treasury’s 2002/3 annual fraud report 3 states that one third of departments and one half of NDPBs were unable to say that they clearly promoted whistleblowing avenues to their staff. As regards Whitehall, we also note the view of the First Civil Service Commissioner and of this Committee that the Civil Service Code is not well known and needs to become a daily reality 4.

For these reasons and on the basis of the experience of our whistleblowing helpline and our work with organisations, we have no doubt that the most important element of whistleblowing policy and practice is that staff are regularly reminded of the avenues open to them. As a result we recommend that employers remind staff through pay-slips, newsletters and management briefings of the policy and the whistleblowing contacts. We think the most effective way to keep the issue live is if the organisation displays posters in the workplace which, while encouraging concerns to be raised with managers, also (a) give senior contacts outside the management line, and (b) detail an external contact (either an oversight body or one that can provide independent, confidential advice on such external options).

We attach at Annex A examples of the posters that we now supply to organisations that take a subscription to our helpline. This subscription - which is based on ten pence per employee per year - does not alter the operation or obligations of our helpline or its availability to all. It does, however, help us to meet the costs of providing the service while helping the subscribing organisation promote its policy and make whistleblowing work. Since the launch of this scheme in 2003, the NHS in England and a good number of public bodies and leading PLCs have taken out these subscriptions.

As to the culture across public bodies generally, we believe there is one further benefit in focussing on the promotion of whistleblowing avenues. Because of the wide differences in the size, function and constitution of public bodies, we see little merit in a prescriptive or ‘one size fits all’ approach to whistleblowing policies. For this reason we caution against the use of model procedures, as we believe that organisations are as likely to reproduce, adopt and ignore the policy as to give the issue any real consideration. Where this happens, the unwitting result is that it embeds the tick-box approach to governance to which whistleblowing should be a valuable counterweight. However, we also recognise that there are good reasons in there being some consistency across public bodies in the way they approach governance. In our view, the right balance can be found if the consistency is in the communication of the core message. In the case of whistleblowing, as we have shown, this should be reminding staff of the internal and external avenues for concerns.

Reviews
While promoting any whistleblowing policy is essential if it is to work, it is also important that an organisation reviews how it works in practice. This enables the organisation to look at the culture and to monitor how concerns are addressed.

Recent developments in the private sector provide valuable guidance on how such reviews can be done. The revised Combined Code on Corporate Governance now places an obligation on the audit committees of listed companies to review how whistleblowing policies operate in practice. This states:

‘The audit committee should review arrangements by which staff of the company may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters of financial reporting or other matters. The audit committee’s objective should be to ensure that arrangements are in place for the proportionate and independent investigation of such matters and for appropriate follow-up action’.

As the potential value of whistleblowing on corporate governance and risk management is as great in a public body as in a private company, we recommend that the board of the public body or its audit committee should also review its whistleblowing arrangements. One additional advantage of such a practice is that it makes it clear that responsibility for the whistleblowing arrangements lies with the board or its audit committee, rather than with the human resource function. While we recognise that human resource departments have a role to play in the development, promotion and monitoring of whistleblowing arrangements, we do not recommend that they are given responsibility for or ownership of the issue 5. This is because many of the issues that are likely to be raised through whistleblowing will go beyond the responsibilities of human resource departments and so they are not well-placed to assess the wider financial and non-financial risks that the substantive concern relates to.

The reason Board or audit committee oversight is justified is illustrated in the approach of the recent guidance issued by the Institute for Chartered Accountants in England & Wales on whistleblowing. While we attach the document at Annex B, we set out below the issues it advises be considered during such a review of the whistleblowing arrangements.

Review of effectiveness
The board ought to consider the effectiveness of whistleblowing policies and procedures on a regular basis. It should provide input to the board’s review of the system of internal control. The review arrangements should be appropriate to the size of the company, the industry in which it operates, the nature of its activities, organisational structure and internal control and risk management systems. For some companies, the internal audit function may provide relevant assurance.

The audit committee might wish to consider:

is there evidence that the board regularly considers whistleblowing procedures as part of its review of the system of internal control?
are there issues or incidents which have otherwise come to the board’s attention which they would have expected to have been raised earlier under the company’s whistleblowing procedures?
where appropriate, has the internal audit function performed any work that provides additional assurance on the effectiveness of the whistleblowing procedures?
are there adequate procedures to track the actions taken in relation to concerns made and to ensure appropriate follow-up action has been taken to investigate and, if necessary, resolve problems indicated by whistleblowing?
are there adequate procedures for retaining evidence in relation to each concern?
have confidentiality issues been handled effectively?
is there evidence of timely and constructive feedback?
have any events come to the committee’s or the board’s attention that might indicate that a staff member has not been fairly treated as a result of their raising concerns?
is a review of staff awareness of the procedures needed?

Compliance
While we think it important that public bodies promote and review their whistleblowing arrangements, we do not recommend this should be made compulsory. This is in part because the size, function and constitution of public bodies varies enormously; in part because the fact that compulsion generates a tick-box response; and in part because we believe more can be achieved if the organisation sees a self-interest in such steps.

The Combined Code referred to above does not require all listed companies to review their whistleblowing arrangements, rather its approach is to put them on notice that this is expected of them and that they will likely be asked by auditors or stakeholders whether and how they have met the obligation.

We think this is the preferred approach for public bodies and imagine that this can best be adopted if the external audit records when the whistleblowing arrangements were reviewed by the Board or audit committee and comments on policy promotion and staff awareness.

Additional observations
There are three additional issues we think may be of interest or relevance to the Committee’s considerations.

Openness, confidentiality and anonymity
As whistleblowing is a means to help promote and deliver the accountability and the openness of an organisation, it is important that staff are encouraged to raise concerns openly and that such openness is seen as the default in any whistleblowing scheme. Rather than leave anonymous leaks as the only viable option for an employee anxious about reprisals, both we and the Committee recommended that whistleblowing arrangements should provide that an employee who goes outside the management line or the organisation can ask that his or her identity not be disclosed without consent.

While such requests should be respected, we advise our helpline clients - and recommend that organisations give similar guidance where such a request is made - that (a) in some cases it may not be possible for the employer or authorities to act on the concern without the whistleblower’s open evidence, and (b) even where the whistleblower’s identity is not disclosed, this is no guarantee that it will not be deduced by those implicated or by colleagues. Where the concern has first been raised locally - and in most cases it has been - the whistleblower’s identity is already known and so unrealistic expectations can be raised if the policy guarantees confidentiality.

Aside from these practical reasons, the Public Interest Disclosure Act has come into force since the recommendations were first made. This has helped to encourage open whistleblowing because of the general protection it provides and because causation is more difficult to establish if the whistleblower’s identity was at the time unknown. While the offer of a confidential route should remain a part of a whistleblowing policy, we think open reporting should be encouraged and recognised as the default. If the Committee agrees, we think it would be helpful if it gave this same message.

Public and private interests
As the Committee has long emphasised, the purpose of whistleblowing is to enable employees to raise concerns of malpractice so that the employer can assess the risk and, as appropriate, address it. Whistleblowing was not designed for employees to pursue private grievances or vendettas and the statutory scheme in the Public Interest Disclosure Act contains safeguards against such misuse. However, unless this distinction is understood by the organisation and promoted to its staff, there is a chance that some employees may try to use whistleblowing arrangements to make or pursue a complaint about their own treatment. That chance can become more likely in a body where the policy is overly legalistic or obscures the essence of whistleblowing 6.

On this point, the Committee should note that the new dispute resolution regime in the Employment Act 2002 encourages organisations to distinguish whistleblowing from grievance procedures and to ensure that their staff understand the difference. Once in force later this year, this legislation will provide an incentive for public bodies to review their whistleblowing policies and ensure that this distinction between public and private interests is better understood and heeded.

Internal systems and independent scrutiny
The Committee may wish to note that one option which has been under consideration at the Shipman Inquiry is whether there should be a new national body to receive whistleblowing concerns from across the NHS. We attach at Annex C our views on this suggestion as we believe, if adopted, it would cut across good practice on whistleblowing and undermine local accountability.

Q 18 Is there evidence that the organisational cultures of the NHS, local government and other public bodies have become more open and accountable as a result of the Public Interest Disclosure Act?
Our impression is that cultures in the NHS, local government and public bodies are becoming more open and accountable. We see many reasons for this, including legislative and structural changes, political initiatives, the expectations of consumers and users, the work of regulators, the scrutiny of legislatures and the media and, above all, how these combine to influence the leadership of public bodies. We think there is good evidence that whistleblowing and the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) has also played a part, though further research is needed. But before turning to the evidence there is, we have a number of observations on the approach and effect of PIDA as these help to put this data in context.

Because culture change can only be secured by influencing the values and conduct of people, we do not expect there will be any conclusive evidence that PIDA or the new approach to whistleblowing it enacts has caused a noticeable shift in organisational accountability or the responsibilities of individuals for a generation or so. Just as the sex and race discrimination legislation 7 did not change prejudices overnight, this is because the declaratory effect of PIDA encourages people to think about and reassess their attitudes not only to whistleblowing and silence, but also to the relationship between public and private interests. While the reassessment prompted by Parliament’s legislative declaration is a major driver of any culture change, the real and substantive protection that PIDA offers in individual cases (which also informs and influences that culture change) cannot be underestimated.

Secondly, PIDA was introduced to reduce the barriers to whistleblowing, to encourage organisations to address concerns of malpractice and to prevent the victimisation of those who do speak up. While its overarching aim was to deter malpractice, the fact is that if PIDA has succeeded in deterring a fraud or stopping a boat from sinking, most times there will be no evidence for the simple reason that the fraud did not take place and the boat did not sink. Equally, if a concern is raised and addressed internally and there is no victimisation of the whistleblower, in our experience there will rarely be any actual or public link of this to the legislation (in part because there continues to be a perception in some quarters that you cannot be a whistleblower unless you have been victimised).

In our view, PIDA itself will more likely come into play where a manager within an organisation is considering taking action against someone who has blown the whistle internally or where the organisation is considering taking action against someone who blown the whistle externally. On this latter point, although it is not yet clear if and how far PIDA influenced the actions of the two officials who blew the whistle externally on serious failings in the immigration service, we think it likely that it is influencing the response of the employers. Considering PIDA’s impact on openness and accountability, it provides the legislative scheme within which Whitehall can provide a culture where such malpractice is deterred, concerns are raised and properly addressed internally and the principle of accountability works in practice 8.

There are, additionally, a good many reported cases where it is the decision under PIDA that has brought to light incidents of wrongdoing. In public life, PIDA cases have included 9 the destruction of prosecution files by a police officer, the misuse of public funds by a charity, the mismanagement of a school, the making of false alarm calls within the fire service, care staff drinking away residents’ money, the issuing of bogus parking penalty notices and the lack of facilities for the elderly in an NHS Trust.

Thirdly, we think it relevant that PIDA is one of the only pieces of employment legislation of the past 15 years that is not criticised by the business community as imposing an excessive burden or a disproportionate cost. Additionally, there is growing evidence that employers now see a self-interest in making whistleblowing work. This is apparent in the approach of the revised Combined Code referred to above, in the responses from the City to the Financial Services Authority proposals on whistleblowing 10 and also in many of the responses to this Issues Paper. Where whistleblowing is seen and understood as being in the organisation’s self-interest - rather than as a legislative requirement - we think the prospects for culture change are encouraging.

Fourthly, the sector where whistleblowing has the highest profile has been the health service - the risks there are great and varied, they affect the highest number of people and the NHS is by far the biggest employer. For these reasons and considering the damage done by a number of incidents in the 1990s where whistles were not blown, one would have expected there to be a good number of cases brought under PIDA by staff who felt they had been victimised for raising patient safety issues. Yet there have only been a handful of NHS PIDA cases in the first five years and none that we are aware of raising major patient safety issues. Nor are we aware of anything that has come to light suggesting there has, post 1999, been such a major issue arose where the whistle was not blown.

Finally, the only cause and effect one can establish beyond doubt as to PIDA is the number of cases it generates. For us this gives a misleading impression as even winning a PIDA case is evidence more of failure than success - for the individual, the employer and the public interest - as someone has been victimised for blowing the whistle in the public interest. That said, the fact that of 100,000 employment claims a year only some 700 are brought under PIDA suggests that victimisation for whistleblowing is not as common as many assume or fear and/or that awareness of PIDA remains low across all sectors.

Combining these observations with the data below that there is more whistleblowing in public bodies now than before PIDA, we think is evidence that we are seeing early signs of a change in the culture of public bodies and that this can be linked to the Act.

PIDA and staff concerns
We think that an indicator of PIDA’s impact on openness and accountability is in evidence that it has had on the incidence of staff raising concerns. The Treasury’s Annual Fraud Reports record a marked increase in the number of Whitehall frauds discovered and stopped by staff raising concerns over the period that PIDA came into force and also that whistleblowing policies were introduced. In the year that PIDA came into force 48% of departments and 57% of NDPBs had whistleblowing policies as part of their anti-fraud controls. By 2002/03 the figures were 100% of departments and 72% of NDPBs. The table below records the percentage of Whitehall frauds stopped year by year which were discovered by whistleblowing:

	1996/7	1997/8	1998/9	1999/0	2000/1	2001/2	2002/3 11
Of Whitehall frauds stopped, those found by whistleblowing	27%	28%	34%	38%	34%	39%	47%

We also think that staff perceptions on the culture for raising concerns is an indicator of PIDA’s effect on the openness and accountability of public bodies. Here the only comparative data on staff views of the culture that we are aware of is in the UNISON/PCaW survey of NHS staff in England conducted in 2002. Of 201 UNISON representatives and members surveyed, 25% said the culture for raising concerns had improved since 1999 (when PIDA came into force), 62% said it was the same and 13% said it was worse. While this is a small survey, the fact that it was of an informed - if not an opinionated and critical - sample, and that twice as many respondents saw an improvement in the culture for raising concerns as a deterioration, shows early signs of a change in culture.

Two other findings from this UNISON/PCaW survey are relevant to the question of PIDA’s effect on accountability and openness. The first is that 90% of staff who had had a patient safety concern had raised it. While there is no comparative data as to previous years, from the experience of our helpline this is a significant improvement over the culture in the NHS in the mid 1990s.

The second is that 48% of staff said they believed their Trust would want them to raise a concern that disclosed a major problem even if it resulted in negative publicity. Again this is a very different result from that which we would have expected to such a question five or more years ago. If this result of this small survey accurately reflects the position across the NHS so that one in two staff believed their Trust would want them to raise a major problem even if it resulted in negative publicity and if that belief were acted on, the NHS would be - and should be seen to be - a much more open and accountable organisation than it was a decade ago.

The encouraging findings of the PCaW/UNISON survey are reflected in an analysis by the Commission for Health Improvement of 175 clinical governance reports 12. This focussed on patient safety (as opposed to the Audit Commission’s surveys on whistleblowing on fraud and the UNISON/PCaW survey on whistleblowing generally) and found that:

93% of NHS staff know how to report errors, near misses and incidents,
85% believe that their employer encourages them to report errors, near misses and incidents, and
62% believe that when errors are reported, their employer takes action to ensure they do not happen again. (This is significant because survey evidence from the USA shows that a belief that nothing will be done is the main reason why staff say they will not raise a concern).

PIDA, whistleblowing policies and public bodies
We have details of four surveys 13 into the incidence and approach of whistleblowing policies in further & higher education, local government, schools and the NHS. The bodies surveyed were in England and Wales, save for the schools survey which only covered England. The research was conducted by postal surveys and was devised and analysed by the Centre for Legal Research at Middlesex University.

The key findings as to the number of public bodies with whistleblowing policies, when and why the policy was introduced, usage and satisfaction ratings are shown in the table below. We also detail the sample size and response rate as we assume those who responded will more likely have a whistleblowing policy than those who did not.

	Further & Higher Education	Local Government	Schools 14	NHS Trusts
Year of survey	2001	2001	2002	2003
Responses (Rate)	349 (58%)	414 (68%)	238 (32%)	154 (55%)
% with a whistle- blowing policy	90%	93%	21%	99%
% of policies introduced pre PIDA	5%	23%	15%	42%
% bodies that cite good practice as key reason for policy	71%	89%	67%	89%
% where policy had been used	11%	55%	29%	77%
V satisfied with policy Satisfied No view Dissatisfied V dissatisfied	20% 65% 15% - -	12% 63% 22% 2% 1%	29% 51% 20% - -	14% 67% 15% 3% 1%

As PIDA does not require any organisation to introduce a whistleblowing policy, there is no inconsistency between the findings that most organisations introduced their policy after PIDA was enacted and that the main driver for the policy was good practice.

That almost all local government and health bodies in England and Wales seem to have policies and that 89% of them saw good practice as the driver demonstrates that whistleblowing is increasingly seen as a good governance tool. Additionally, the fact that over three-quarters of the respondent organisations in the four sectors expressed satisfaction with their policy suggests that whistleblowing may be having a positive effect on culture. However, as we have said a policy is of little use if few staff know of it or if it omits or obscures the essence of whistleblowing. Therefore it cannot be said that on their own these surveys do more than tend to show that PIDA has made cultures in public bodies more open and accountable.

Scotland
There is, however, one important caveat to these encouraging findings and this is that they cannot be assumed to apply in Scotland.

First, we note that the Scottish Executive has, in its response to this Issues Paper, in contrast to that of the Welsh Assembly, chosen not to address the whistleblowing questions. We regret this, particularly as the Holyrood Inquiry is considering in part why concerns about the overspend were either not raised or not addressed.

Secondly, as to attitudes in NHS Scotland a survey by the Royal College of Nurses Scotland reported that 36% of nurses would not speak out publicly if they had concerns about patient care and a further 23% were not confident they would. The survey results are not comparable with those of the PCaW/UNISON survey because the assumption behind the RCN survey appears to be that whistleblowing means only raising concerns publicly.

There is the prospect of some improvement. We attach at Annex D two leaflets we have produced with Audit Scotland for the public sector in Scotland. If these are effectively distributed and the messages they contain are absorbed we are hopeful that the culture toward whistleblowing north of the border will improve before too long.

PIDA, openness & accountability
When PIDA was considered and passed, tribunal claim forms were on the public record. This meant that it was possible for us or anyone else to have an idea in every whistleblowing case, about the alleged malpractice, disclosure and reprisal and also to see whether the case came from the public, private or voluntary sectors. In the autumn of 2000 the rules were suddenly changed so that this information was no longer on the public record. The practical effect of this was that it was no longer possible to find on the public record what the whistleblowing was about in the two-thirds of PIDA claims which did not go to a full hearing.

Our concern was that apart from limiting the information about how PIDA was being used, such new secrecy might enable the public interest which PIDA promotes to be traded for private gain in cases where the whistleblower had been dismissed after an internal disclosure as if his or her claim was then settled information about the alleged or proven wrongdoing could now be kept secret. We are pleased to record that, recognising the purpose and role of PIDA, ministers at the Department of Trade & Industry have confirmed that the Government has no objection in principle or policy to information about PIDA claims being made public again. We understand that the rules are to be changed in the light of this and when they are, they will reassert the role of PIDA in fostering a more open and accountable culture.

Links
Addendum on effect of the Public Interest Disclosure Act on Public Sector Culture

Some of the Whitehall frauds stopped by whistleblowing

The first six recommendations are from the CSPL Second Report (page 22); the seventh and eighth from the Third Report (pages 49 and 65), which also restated the fifth recommendation; and the ninth came from the Stocktake Report (page 23).
Is whistleblowing working in the NHS? (May 2003) UNISON and PCaW
HM Treasury, 2002-3 Fraud Report (Jan 2004), conclusion page 4 and survey page 35.
CSPL, Ninth Report, page 40
The Middlesex University survey of whistleblowing arrangements in the NHS, detailed at footnote 10, reported that monitoring was the responsibility of human resources in 53 trusts, of clinical governance in 5, of risk management in 4 and of the CEO in 3.
As an example of this, we note that in the Committee’s stocktake of its first seven reports, the Higher Education Funding Council for England is recorded as stating that as regards whistleblowing complaints from staff and students, it considers that this area of work had significant and increasing resource implications. We equate complaints from students with those from consumers and question whether it is right or helpful to treat them as whistleblowing. As to the reference to complaints and the comments on resource implications, we wonder whether the policies then used in this sector distinguished clearly between staff grievances about their own position and whistleblowing concerns.
The analogy between PIDA and discrimination laws was recognised in Virgo Fidelis School v Boyle (Time Law Reports 26 Feb 2004) when the Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that compensation awards under PIDA should be treated as under discrimination rather than regular employment law, providing for injury to feelings and aggravated damages.
As to the whistleblowing to the media about the unauthorised BRACE policy, the minister pointed out that the Government had introduced PIDA and that “the bottom line is that I am glad that I now know what has been going on; I am glad that someone has told me - and so are the senior managers [though I regret the method Mr Moxon used]” Hansard HC 8 March 2004, col 1252. The following day before the Home Affairs Committee, the Minister said at q52 “when a group of officials have changed a procedure and insisted that that is kept secret, not only from ministers but senior officials, it is absolutely absurd to imply that affects my responsibilities and that is something I am responsible for as opposed to accountable for putting right”. As to the whistleblowing by Mr Cameron the consul in Bucharest, the Home Secretary remarked “Some of us - including the minister of state and me - believe that if material is placed before senior management they should act on it. We are talking about allegations of fraud and forged documents. People who use false papers and have an immigration history that rules them out should be ruled out. It does not require a great deal of intelligence to recognise that, just common sense.” Hansard HC 30 March col 1433.
PIDA case summaries (PCaW) April 2003. This looked at the first 70 PIDA decisions.
Whistleblowing (FSA) April 2002. The Financial Services Authority concluded the cost-benefit analysis section to its policy paper as follows “[8.25] Respondents … all agreed that the costs in implementing or reassessing whistleblowing procedures are minimal…. [8.26] The benefits were described by one respondent as “intangible” and hard to quantify, but “significant for the business of any regulated firm”. One respondent claimed that it was “easy to see that effective in-house whistleblowing arrangements are a benefit to both firms and consumers”. Firms will benefit, as consumer confidence in products and services increase. Consumers will benefit as malpractice may be dealt with more transparently, and will potentially benefit as firms devote extra resources to products and services, rather than current procedures to deal with malpractice. [8.27] So whistleblowing procedures may lead to improving the quality and quantity of services provided. The industry and the consumer may also benefit from the improved morale in the workplace and the important role whistleblowing procedures play in risk management.”
Please note that the Treasury slightly altered the definition of categories in the 2002/03 report.
Emerging Themes (November 2002) Commission for Health Improvement
The local authority survey was published by the Employers Organisation for local government in September 2002. The other three were respectively published by Centre for Legal Research, Middlesex University in March 2001, February and November 2003,
The figures shown for schools exclude the responses from LEAs and so differ slightly from the headline figures in the survey report.

Public Concern

Making Whistleblowing Work

Getting the Balance Right